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Abstract Bargaining is a tool to share collaborative gains and to facilitate reaching
agreement. To improve incentives to join an international climate agreement (ICA), the
Nash bargaining solution can be used to distribute cooperative gains across signatories. In
this paper, we examine how the formation of ICAs and their mitigation efficiency are
impacted by the use of the Nash bargaining solution. In a Nash bargaining game with
heterogeneous players, bargaining powers are unequal and may be driven by different
characteristics of the players. We employ different sets of asymmetric bargaining weights
in order to examine the effectiveness of climate coalitions that emerge as stable agree-
ments. Using the Nash bargaining solution, we obtain results from the stability of coalition
model (STACO). We find that the Nash bargaining solution can improve the participation
incentives and performances of ICAs as compared to agreements that do not redistribute
gains from cooperation, but its capacity to overcome free-riding incentives is limited.
However, if Nash bargaining accounts for outside options of players, we find larger
stable coalitions and higher global abatement levels. In fact, Nash bargaining with outside
options can stabilise the largest coalitions that can possibly be stable in our game.
Keywords International environmental agreements  Bargaining power  Climate
agreements  Optimal transfers  STACO model
1 Introduction
Mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is costly. Due to the public good property
of GHG emissions mitigation, each individual country has an incentive to free ride on the
abatement efforts of other countries. However, through multilateral negotiations an
international climate agreement can be formed to alleviate the social dilemma (Carraro and
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Siniscalco 1993; Finus 2003). A climate agreement comprises a mitigation target for
members, but also needs to distribute gains from cooperation.
The distribution of coalitional gains across countries can be organised through transfer
schemes which are effective instruments to offset free-riding incentives and improve the
stability of international climate agreements (ICAs) (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett
1995; Botteon and Carraro 1997; Rose et al. 1998; Rose and Stevens 1998; Weikard et al.
2006; Carraro et al. 2006; Weikard 2009; Nagashima et al. 2009). Sharing the gains of
cooperation is solving a bargaining problem (Nash 1950; Powell 2002); hence, the Nash
bargaining solution (NBS) can be used to determine transfer schemes for ICAs. Carraro
and Siniscalco (1993) analyse the role of welfare transfers for coalition stability among
symmetric players when transfers are determined by applying the Nash bargaining solu-
tion. Their theoretical results show that the size of stable coalitions can be extended by
‘bribing’ singletons with transfers. Botteon and Carraro (1997) and Carraro et al. (2006)
apply the Nash bargaining rule to surplus sharing within coalitions. They extend the
analysis to asymmetric players, and their results are derived resorting to numerical anal-
ysis. However, previous studies on the application of a Nash bargaining rule assume equal
bargaining weights among countries and do not take the different bargaining powers of
asymmetric countries into account. Bargaining powers determine the sharing of collective
gains which, in turn, determines the incentives to join a climate agreement. In this paper,
we assume that the distribution of gains is the outcome of a bargaining process with
unequal bargaining power, and thus, transfers are determined by bargaining power. We
employ the Nash bargaining solution to model the distribution of cooperative gains. The
bargaining outcome is subject to bargaining power. The key issue is what constitutes the
bargaining power of each negotiator. Costantini et al. (2015) provide a sketch of future
potential bargaining positions of developing countries in climate negotiations according to
key structural features like economic power, geographic, environmental and social char-
acteristics, and the energy system. Considering the importance of bargaining power in
climate negotiations, we discuss and review potential reasons that could induce differences
of negotiators’ bargaining power in international climate negotiations. Thus, determinants
of bargaining power can be identified and then used for the quantification of negotiators’
bargaining weights. Furthermore, we model the international climate negotiations as a
Nash bargaining game in which cooperative gains are distributed based on the NBS with
asymmetric bargaining power, and we study which climate coalitions could form, given the
different bargaining powers of the negotiators.
Although Nash bargaining has been used as a transfer scheme in the literature on ICAs,
it has not been investigated in depth for the surplus sharing of coalitional gains among
countries with unequal bargaining powers. The novelty of this paper is that we explore the
impact of using the NBS for distributing coalitional gains under different sets of bargaining
weights on the stability and effectiveness of international climate agreements. We consider
different possible determinants of bargaining power which are exogenously determined in
our model. Our analysis complements the set of coalitional surplus sharing rules.
In this paper, we identify five different factors that can determine negotiators’ bar-
gaining power. (1) In bargaining theory, time preference, i.e. the willingness to wait for the
payoff is often proposed as a driving factor that can influence the distribution of gains. A
player who is more patient has more bargaining power (Rubinstein 1982; Binmore et al.
1992; Powell 2002). Thus, we use time preference represented by the discount factor to
determine bargaining power of negotiating countries. (2) In climate negotiations, it is
commonly argued that the distribution of cooperative payoffs should be in accordance with
abatement efforts. Larger efforts give a claim to a larger share of the gains. Hence, we use
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the proportion of individual abatement in a coalition to represent each negotiator’s bar-
gaining weight. (3) Another way to assess efforts is to use abatement costs. This is different
from (2) if countries differ in marginal costs of abatement. Larger costs could justify a
larger claim. Thus, we use countries’ total abatement costs, reflecting their monetary
efforts as an indicator of bargaining power. (4) Abatement benefits of a country reflect the
avoided damages from reducing GHG emissions which are associated with a country’s
vulnerability to climate change. A country that is more vulnerable to climate change will
be more eager to get involved in the climate cooperation than a country that is less
vulnerable. Hence, we use the inverse of abatement benefits as an indicator of bargaining
power. (5) In international negotiations, economically powerful countries can be more
successful in shaping the agreement. We therefore take the economic power measured by
gross domestic product (GDP) as an indicator of bargaining power.
To compare and examine the impact of the NBS with different sets of unequal bar-
gaining weights on incentives to cooperate, we formulate a two-stage cartel formation
game. At the first stage, each country decides whether to participate in a climate coalition
or not by evaluating payoffs received from being a signatory or a singleton. At the second
stage, abatement targets are set cooperatively by coalition members, but their individual
payoffs are determined by applying the NBS with a given set of bargaining weights.
A bargaining solution is not just affected by bargaining power, but also by players’
outside options (Wagner 1988; Powell 2002). A decision to take up an outside option
implies a withdrawal from the bargaining process. The outside option payoff imposes a
lower bound on the bargaining solution since no one must accept an agreement that makes
him worse off compared to what he can obtain otherwise (Binmore et al. 1992; Muthoo
1999). For the bargaining problem of international climate agreements, we assume that a
country’s outside option is to abstain from an agreement and to remain a singleton player.
This is in line with Muthoo (1999, p. 105) who explains that outside options do not affect
the disagreement point. The Nash bargaining solution with outside options falls in the class
of optimal sharing rules described by Carraro et al. (2006) and Weikard (2009). Hence, our
paper provides an additional motivation for the use of optimal sharing rules.
We adopt the concept of internal and external stability to analyse our game (cf.
D’Aspremont et al. 1983). An agreement is internally stable if no member wants to leave.
It is externally stable if no other player wants to join. This implies that we consider only
single deviations which define the outside option payoffs. If a deviation would trigger
others’ withdrawal from the coalition, a simple internal/external stability concept would
not be adequate and more sophisticated solution concepts such as coalition proof equi-
librium (Bernheim et al. 1987) or farsighted stability (Chwe 1994) could be employed. De
Zeeuw (2008) shows that farsighted coalition stability can lead to larger stable coalitions
with higher global welfare. Another assumption that we adopt is that we allow only for one
coalition. A deviator from the coalition becomes a singleton and cannot make an agree-
ment with other players. Allowing for multiple coalitions would lead to higher abatement
levels and global welfare as has been shown by Asheim et al. (2006) and Sa´iz et al. (2006).
However, in this paper we do not consider the possibility of multiple coalition structures
and we confine the analysis to internal and external stability. The implications of refined
solution concepts are left to future research.
To see how different sets of bargaining weights and the relevance of outside options
impact coalition stability, we compare results from the STACO (stability of coalitions)
model. STACO is a global model with calibrated abatement costs and benefits functions for
12 world regions. We use it to test stability of the 212  12 possible coalitions that may
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form. Our results provide implications of sharing rules based on the NBS and also its
impact on the formation and stability of ICAs.
In what follows, we present the game in Sect. 2. Section 3 discusses potential deter-
minants of bargaining power, i.e. we introduce different sets of bargaining weights used in
the NBS for distributing cooperative gains. Section 4 describes the STACO model and our
numerical results in more detail. The paper ends with discussions and conclusions in
Sect. 5.
2 The game theoretical model
We consider a set of players N ¼ 1; 2; . . .; nf g representing countries or regions that
negotiate an agreement on mitigating GHG emissions. We allow for asymmetric abatement
benefits and costs. The formation of a climate agreement is modelled by the following a
two-stage game.
Stage 1 All players i 2 Nð Þ announce whether to sign an agreement or not. Their deci-
sions are made non-cooperatively and simultaneously. Formally, an agreement is a subset
of the set of players. The set of all possible agreements is:
f ¼ S  Njs 2f g; fj j ¼ 2n  nþ 1ð Þ:
where s ¼ Sj j represents the number of signatories. If negotiations fail, then there is no
agreement and all players remain singletons.
Stage 2 At the second stage signatories S and the remaining singletons play a trans-
boundary pollution game. Abatement strategies are chosen simultaneously by signatories
and singletons. Signatories (i 2 S) decide on their abatement by maximising their aggre-
gated payoffs; non-signatories (i 2 NnS) maximise their individual payoff. If no agreement
has been reached at stage 1, payoffs are determined by the non-cooperative equilibrium
outcome of a n-player transboundary pollution game. We denote this outcome by D as it
represents the disagreement point of the bargaining game.
The set of abatement choices by all players can be defined as q ¼ ðq1; . . .; qn) with the
condition qi 2 0; ei½ , where ei denotes the business-as-usual emissions level. Once
abatement is chosen, the individual signatory’s payoff denoted by pi qð Þ can be determined,
where q denotes the abatement vector. The coalitional gains of the agreement S are the
difference between the aggregate payoff of signatories
P
i2S pi qð Þ and what they would get
in case of disagreement. The final payoffs of signatories denoted by pi are based on the
NBS used to redistribute the coalitional gains. The set of weights reflecting bargaining
power is denoted by kif gi2S. It is exogenously determined in our model.
Note that in our game, we only consider the formation of one single agreement, such
that a player deviating from S becomes a non-signatory. Therefore, the outside option for
each signatory i 2 S in our Nash bargaining game is the payoff received as a singleton
when other players maintain their membership status. In this setting, for an agreement S
with only two signatories (i.e. s ¼ 2), the outside option is identical to the disagreement
point or status quo, but in general this is not the case. Obviously, an agreement S can be
accepted by a signatory if and only if its coalitional payoff is larger than its outside option
payoff.
We solve this two-stage game by backward induction in order to identify the sub-game
perfect Nash equilibria. At stage 2, the signatories i 2 S choose their optimal abatement
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levels qi by maximising joint payoffs denoted by
P
i2S pi. We have the following max-





pi qð Þ ¼
X
i2S
Bi qð Þ  Ci qið Þð Þ: ð1Þ
where q ¼Pi2N qi denotes the global abatement level. The abatement cost function
denoted by Ci qið Þ is increasing and strictly convex, i.e. C0i qið Þ[ 0 and C
00
i qið Þ[ 0.
Abatement benefits Bi qð Þ, depend on the overall level of abatement q and are assumed to
be linearly increasing, i.e. B
0
i qð Þ[ 0 and B
00
i qð Þ ¼ 0, implying a dominant strategy for each
player. The equilibrium condition for signatories i 2 S is derived from the first-order













At this stage, each non-signatory maximises its own payoffs. The problem for non-
signatories can be formulated as follows:
max
qi
pi qð Þ ¼ Bi qð Þ  Ci qið Þ: ð3Þ
The equilibrium condition for singletons i 2 NnS can be obtained by deriving the first-
order condition of the problem (3). This gives B
0
i q
ð Þ ¼ C0i qi
 
:
Based on abatement choices of all players, the payoffs of signatories and singletons can
be determined. Signatories redistribute the aggregated payoffs
P
i2S pi qð Þ based on the
NBS. Their bargaining powers are unequal and given by a set of bargaining weights
kif gi2S. The redistributed payoff under the NBS can be represented by a set denoted by
pi
 







 ki ; s:t: pi  pi; p1 þ . . .þ ps ¼
X
i2S
pi qð Þ ð4Þ
in which pi represents the non-cooperative payoffs of signatories i 2 S, which is the
disagreement point (ðpiÞi2S ¼ D). We assume that gains from cooperation can be redis-
tributed among signatories without incurring transactions costs. Therefore, the bargaining
set is convex and compact which ensures the uniqueness of the solution of bargaining
problem (4). Signatories’ bargaining weights satisfy the condition
P
i2S ki ¼ 1. A higher
value of ki indicates a strategic advantage in the bargaining process.
At stage 1, all players decide to sign an agreement or not. Here, we use the partition
function Vi Sð Þ that can be derived from the solution of the stage 2 game to represent each
player’s payoffs under the coalition S based on the NBS. Note that a signatory receives its
outside option payoffs when deviating from the coalition S, denoted by Vi Sn if gð Þ. The
Nash equilibrium of the stage 1 game satisfies the following internal and external stability
conditions (d’Aspremont et al. 1983).
Internal stability:
Vi Sð ÞVi Sn if gð Þ; i 2 S: ð5Þ
External stability:
Vi Sð ÞVi S [ if gð Þ; i 2 NnS: ð6Þ
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3 The representation and interpretation of different sets of bargaining
weights
In this section, we discuss factors that could lead to differences in countries’ bargaining
power in international climate negotiations. Based on these factors, weights of bargaining
power can be identified that will be used to determine the bargaining outcomes and, hence,
the individual payoffs for all coalition members. We also explain the relevance of outside
options in our game and discuss their role for stable climate agreements.
3.1 Bargaining weights based on discount factor
Gains from cooperation can only be obtained when an agreement is reached. A delay of
reaching an agreement is costly (Rubinstein 1982; Muthoo 1999). This is particularly
relevant for climate agreements: the sooner cooperation is achieved, the smaller the climate
damages will be (Courtois and Tazdaı¨t 2014). Binmore et al. (1986) show that in a
bargaining game players’ time preferences impact their strategic choices and thus the
bargaining solution. The discount factor reflects a player’s willingness to wait and can be
used as an indicator of the negotiators’ bargaining power.
Over time, the net present value (NPV) of the gains from cooperation falls quicker for a
region with a higher discount rate than for a region with a lower discount rate. Therefore,
the higher a region’s discount rate, the stronger its preference for an ICA that is formed and
implemented earlier. Regions with a strong preference to reach an agreement are more
willing to give in. They will have a larger cost of waiting and therefore less bargaining
power.
Let ri be the discount rate prevailing in region i. We use the discount factor denoted by
di  11þri to represent the bargaining power of signatory i in the negotiation. The corre-
sponding bargaining weight can be represented as:
ki ¼ diP
j2S dj
; i 2 S: ð7Þ
Under this set of bargaining weights, regions with relative lower discount rates are
expected to have stronger participation incentives induced by higher bargaining weights
and a larger share of coalitional gains.
3.2 Bargaining weights based on abatement efforts
As compared to developed regions with high marginal abatement costs and benefits,
developing regions with low marginal abatement costs and benefits have less incentives to
join a climate coalition. The main reason is that developing regions contribute larger shares
of global abatement but with lower private returns. Considering the importance of
developing regions’ contribution to abatement, it can be argued that regions engaging in
greater abatement efforts, if they join, can ask for a larger share of the gains. Hence, we use
the proportion of individual abatement in a coalition to represent each negotiator’s bar-
gaining weight. The larger the mitigation efforts of a coalition member, the larger its
bargaining power in the negotiation over coalitional gains. The bargaining weight based on
abatement efforts can be formulated as:








; i 2 S; ð8Þ
in which qi is the equilibrium abatement level of each signatory i of coalition S. It can be
expected that under this set of bargaining weights, regions contributing larger shares to the
coalitional abatement will have more incentives to participate.
3.3 Bargaining weights based on abatement costs
Within a climate coalition, due to differences in the technological development and the
resulting differences in marginal abatement costs between countries, a large abatement
assignment of a member does not necessarily imply high total abatement costs if marginal
abatement costs are low. Hence, abatement effort qi does not accurately reflect the cost
each member pays for cooperation. The controversy about collaborative gains allocation
that is induced by countries’ uneven costs for mitigation cooperation has been a recurring
issue put on the negotiation table (Barrett and Stavins 2003; Carraro et al. 2006). Gen-
erally, countries taking on larger abatement costs would claim compensation in the form of
a larger share of the cooperative gains. If the total abatement is seen as a joint effort
requiring investment, then the gains from cooperation should be distributed proportional to
these investments. Hence, a country’s abatement cost can be identified as a source of
asymmetry in bargaining power during negotiations on climate cooperation. We take the
abatement cost of a country as a measure of its bargaining power. The bargaining weight










  ; i 2 S: ð9Þ
Under such a set of bargaining weights, the higher a country’s abatement cost, the
higher will be its share of the gains from cooperation.
3.4 Bargaining weights based on climate change damages
Damages resulting from climate change differ across regions due to different impacts of
climate change, different economic losses and different valuations of environmental
quality. Regions facing high damages are eager to mitigate climate change. However, the
low-damage regions have less incentives to join the cooperation. This difference in pref-
erences for climate cooperation implies that low-damage countries hold more bargaining
power than high-damage countries.
In our model, abatement benefits are avoided climate change damages. Hence, we use
abatement benefits to represent climate change vulnerability. Bargaining power is then
inversely related to climate change vulnerability. The bargaining weight based on damages







; i 2 S: ð10Þ
From Eq. (10), it is straightforward to see that higher benefits from global abatement are
associated with lower bargaining power and a lower bargaining weight ki.
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3.5 Bargaining weights based on economic power
In international negotiations among asymmetric regions, the economic power reflected by
the GDP of a region can affect its bargaining power. Generally, regions which are char-
acterised by a larger GDP can exert more influence over the regions with a lower GDP, for
example, through issue linkage. Issue linkage connects environmental negotiations with
other economic issues (e.g. trade or technological cooperation). Issue linkage can offset
free-riding incentives in climate cooperation (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, 1995). In cli-
mate negotiations, regions with an economic advantage can put pressure on poorer regions
with ‘sticks and carrots’. For example, they can withhold or offer technological cooper-
ation. Therefore, regions who have advantage in economic power have larger bargaining
power in climate negotiations. Based on this argument, economically powerful regions can
obtain a larger share of the joint payoff. This reasoning has also been put forward by Rose
et al. (1998) where they discuss a transfer rule based on income claims. Determining




; i 2 S: ð11Þ
3.6 Outside options
In the bargaining game, outside options introduce a lower bound on each player’s payoff.
The presence of outside options can thus affect the negotiation outcome by considering the
impact of the minimum payoff a player can assure for himself when leaving the negoti-
ation. Hence, in our game we assume that a region’s outside option is to abstain from an
agreement and to remain a singleton player. As mentioned before, a player’s outside option
payoff can be written as Vi Sn if gð Þ. In the literature of examining coalition stability in
cartel games, it has been pointed out that coalition S can be internally stable whenever the
coalition payoff does not fall short of the sum of members’ outside options, i.e.
X
i2S
Vi Sð Þ 
X
i2S
Vi Sn if gð Þ: ð12Þ
Inequality (12) is a necessary condition for internal stability of coalition S. If we
consider a bargaining solution with outside options, then the outside option payoff is
guaranteed for each signatory whenever (12) is satisfied. Carraro et al. (2006) and Weikard
(2009) have called solutions satisfying internal stability when (12) holds ‘optimal trans-
fers’, since payoffs are re-arranged to incentivise participation in the agreement. It is
obvious then that bargaining with outside options belongs to the class of optimal transfer
rules. It is important to note that the set of stable coalitions is not affected by the distri-
bution of the surplus that remains after all signatories have received their outside option
payoffs. This implies that in our game, under bargaining with outside options, the set of
stable coalitions is independent of bargaining weights ki. Hence, for the analysis of sta-
bility there is no need to apply different sets of bargaining weights.
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4 Simulations and results
In this section, we describe the implementation of the simulation analysis employing the
STACO model in Sect. 4.1. Section 4.2 presents the simulation results and a discussion of
our findings concerning stability and effectiveness of coalitions under the NBS. We
examine the relevance of outside options in Sect. 4.3. All results and discussions in this
section are based on the STACO 3 model as documented by Nagashima et al. (2011) and
Dellink et al. (2015).
4.1 Simulations employing the STACO model
To gain practical insights into the implications of the NBS with different sets of bargaining
weights, we employ a numerical simulation model, the STACO model. The STACO model
is a combined game-theoretic and integrated assessment model created to examine the
formation and performances of international climate agreements among twelve world
regions as specified in Table 5 in Appendix (cf. also Nagashima et al. 2011; Dellink et al.
2015). By specifying the abatement benefit and cost functions for these twelve heteroge-
neous regions, the STACO model enables us to analyse coalition stability, abatement
levels, efficiency and welfare. Considering inertia of the climate system, the simulation
analysis in STACO adopts a 100-year time horizon (from 2010 to 2110). The formation of
an ICA in STACO is a standard two-stage cartel formation game, in which the membership
decision is taken once and for all periods. The abatement choice of each player i for the
whole time horizon can be represented by an abatement path ðqi;1,…,qi;100). Accordingly,
the payoffs of each player over the planning horizon can be represented as a payoff path
(pi;1; . . .; p

i;100Þ. Finally, the stability of a climate coalition is checked based on the net
present value of the payoff stream over 100 years according to the internal and external
stability conditions (5) and (6). For a full specification of the latest version of the STACO
model (STACO 3), the reader is referred to Nagashima et al. (2011) and Dellink et al.
(2015).
For our simulations, we use the numerical computing software MATLAB. For each
period, signatories and singletons decide their optimal abatement qi;t according to Eqs. (2)
and (3). Accordingly, the payoffs of signatories can be derived in each period based on
Nash bargaining solutions described in Eq. (4). The payoffs of singletons are the net gains
from abatement. In particular, each signatory’s bargaining weight ki;t in each period is
based on the value of different determining factors at each period, for example, the dis-








and economic power GDPi;t. For each set of bargaining weights, we calculate the abate-
ment and payoffs path of each region under every coalition that can be formed. Finally,
based on the calculation of the NPV of each player’s payoff stream over 100 years we
perform a stability check for each coalition according to Eqs. (5) and (6).
4.2 Results for the Nash bargaining solution without consideration of outside
options
In this section, we report and discuss results on coalition formation and performances
under the NBS with different sets of bargaining weights. The role of outside options is
discussed in Sect. 4.3.
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To compare our surplus sharing scheme based on the NBS with other conventional
sharing schemes that are frequently discussed (for example, egalitarian, historical
responsibility or ability to pay), we calculate transfers generated in NBS under the five
different sets of bargaining weights for the grand coalition. Table 1 illustrates the amount
of transfers for each region under various sets of bargaining weights. Regions with neg-
ative transfers are payers, and regions with positive transfers are receivers. Due to high
marginal abatement benefits, USA, JPN and EUR can benefit more than other regions.
Hence, USA, JPN and EUR are always transfer payers under all five sets of bargaining
weights. This result is in line with the result under the egalitarian and ability-to-pay sharing
scheme calculated by Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) using STACO. However, JPN
becomes a transfer receiver under a historical responsibility rule. This is due to the low
business-as-usual emissions of JPN, implying that JPN contributes less to the current GHG
concentration, and thus, JPN has a low mitigation target. In terms of the amount of
transfers, JPN and EUR are the two largest payers and their payments are much larger than
under the egalitarian and ability-to-pay rule in Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006). In
contrast, USA pays the largest amount of transfers under the egalitarian and ability-to-pay
rule in Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006). This is due to USA’s relatively large pop-
ulation and high GDP per capita. From Table 1, it can also be seen that CHN and BRA
always receive the largest amounts of transfers under different bargaining weights. This
also explains why CHN and BRA have strong participation incentives as shown in Table 2.
When other conventional sharing rules are applied, IND and BRA are the largest transfer
receivers (Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus 2006).
Now we turn to the stability results when the NBS is used to redistribute coalitional
gains. Firstly, our results show that all coalitions with two members are internally stable.
As explained by Weikard et al. (2006), this result is related to the linear functional form of
abatement benefits and non-negative weights, which ensure a positive coalitional surplus.
Thus, being a signatory of a two-member coalition gives a larger payoff than that of being











USA -6364.37 -5687.02 -6209.24 -3275.24 -1312.63
JPN -7784.00 -12,176.82 -11,725.37 -12,608.12 -8925.65
EUR -12,470.40 -13,604.72 -12,568.08 -12,251.56 -8135.26
OHI 2609.60 -214.57 3603.85 1862.57 1625.68
ROE 1289.63 492.82 2565.22 262.06 1194.35
RUS 3735.38 1109.04 5010.89 2116.59 862.58
HIA 2535.77 1278.78 4356.11 3903.70 1859.10
CHN 2471.66 4876.11 3010.30 4991.20 4383.22
IND 1164.29 1234.09 1584.42 1422.41 583.73
MES 2162.61 2431.62 5254.77 2684.92 1173.04
BRA 4842.53 810.31 7591.57 822.07 1732.48
ROW 1506.56 2181.38 2247.70 3810.50 3079.45
Total 0 0 0 0 0
All figures are expressed as NPV of transfers (bln$) over 100 years
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a singleton. Table 2 shows the results for stable coalitions and the value of bargaining
weights for each signatory under different determinants of the bargaining power. The
second column of Table 2 lists all stable coalitions for the five sets of asymmetric bar-
gaining weights described in Sect. 3 and a reference scenario with equal weights. Under
the scenario with equal bargaining weights, three coalitions (i.e. {RUS, CHN, BRA},
{HIA, CHN, BRA} and {CHN, IND, BRA}) are stable. In STACO, regions like RUS,
CHN and IND are characterised by flat marginal abatement cost curves and by a moderate
level of abatement benefits (see Table 6 and Fig. 2 in Appendix). In a coalition of regions
with similar marginal abatement costs and benefits, participation incentives can be pro-
moted and maintained with equal sharing of collective gains. Regions BRA and HIA face
steep marginal abatement cost curves and low marginal benefit shares. Hence, when
joining a coalition the required additional abatement remains limited. It is CHN that
undertakes the largest abatement efforts but also not much more than under all singletons.
As shown in Table 2, generally, there are small stable coalitions under all sets of
bargaining weights we examine. The reason is that for each set of asymmetric bargaining
weights, only the regions with an advantage have sufficient incentives to join. For example,
as our numerical results show, USA has strong incentives to join an ICA with members
HIA, CHN and BRA when the bargaining weight is based on GDP, whereas among six
stable coalitions only China, India and the rest of the world are motivated to join with large
incentives when the bargaining weight is determined by abatement efforts. Our results also
show that multiple equilibrium coalitions emerge under each set of bargaining weights.
Generally, among all determinants, more coalitions can be stabilised when bargaining
power is determined by signatories’ abatement efforts, damages and abatement costs. It
should be noticed that same stable coalitions can emerge under different sets of bargaining
power; for example, coalitions {OHI, CHN}, {ROE, CHN} and {RUS, CHN} can be
stabilised with bargaining weights based on ‘abatement efforts’ and ‘abatement costs’.
Even though some regions’ bargaining power can be interpreted as different values under
different determinants, and the corresponding NBS in terms of the distribution of coali-
tional gains is also changed accordingly, the same equilibria with respect to the
stable coalitions can still be reached. It is also interesting to see that, even though there are
multiple equilibrium coalition structures for each distribution of bargaining weights, one
coalition member is present in each equilibrium structure (CHN or BRA). This is due to
their relatively larger bargaining weights under the respective set of weights (see Table 2).
When the bargaining weight is determined by regions’ discount factors, regions with
high discount rates, for example, CHN and IND, cannot strike an agreement with
developed regions like USA, JPN and EUR which have low discount rates and induce
large additional abatement efforts of CHN. Due to low discount rates (see Appendix
Table 6), developed regions like USA, JPN and EUR are in a better bargaining position
compared to regions that have high discount rates and CHN cannot recover the cost of
abatement. However, as shown in Table 2, cooperation can be established between CHN
and regions like ROE, BRA and RUS (e.g. {ROE, CHN, BRA}, {RUS, CHN, BRA}). To
see why such coalitions can be stable, notice that ROE, RUS and BRA have low mar-
ginal benefits, requiring little extra abatement compared to disagreement. To shed more
light on stability, consider Fig. 1 which depicts the payoff space for RUS and CHN in a
coalition with BRA. This coalition is stable under equal and discounting bargaining
weights. In Fig. 1, D ¼ 836:58; 283:52ð Þ is the disagreement point. BRA’s payoff in that
point is 244.52 and not reported in the figure. The downward sloping line depicts any
payoff distribution between CHN and RUS when BRA receives its outside option payoff,
a minimum requirement for internal stability. Hence, to the right of that line where RUS
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and CHN receive more and BRA receives less the coalition cannot be stable. The dashed
vertical and horizontal lines depict the outside option payoffs of RUS and CHN,
respectively. Only bargaining solutions that produce payoff vectors in the shaded triangle
will be internally stable. We highlight three points in Fig. 1. Point B ¼ 884:80; 289:66ð Þ
is the best payoffs that BRA can obtain 288:22ð Þ in a stable coalition with RUS and
CHN. Both RUS and CHN receive only their outside option payoff. Points E ¼
884:92; 295:66ð Þ and F ¼ 885:31; 294:38ð Þ are the bargaining solutions for equal bar-
gaining weights and weights based on discounting. Both are stable as shown in Table 2
and very close to each other as shown in Fig. 1.
In scenarios where bargaining weights are based on abatement efforts and abatement
costs, China is a member of all stable coalitions. This can be attributed to China’s
advantage in terms of low marginal abatement costs, which makes China contribute large
shares to the total coalitional abatement. The large contribution to coalitional abatement
puts China in a strong bargaining position, and it therefore receives a larger share of the
gains. However, there are two exceptions of stable coalitions (i.e. {CHN, IND} and {CHN,
ROW}), in which the bargaining weights of CHN are lower compared to IND and ROW
(i.e. kCHN ¼ 0.47 and 0.39), see Table 2. This is due to the lower marginal abatement costs
of IND and ROW as compared to CHN at the equilibrium abatement level.
Under bargaining weights determined by climate change damages, BRA always has
more bargaining power because of its lowest benefit share. Hence, as shown in the scenario
for damage weights in Table 2, BRA has generally a higher bargaining weight than its
respective coalition partner (except when it forms a coalition with India) and thus appears
in all stable coalitions in this scenario. Under bargaining weights determined by the
economic power, USA holds an advantageous bargaining position in the negotiation. As
shown in the last row of Table 2, USA has the largest bargaining weight in the coalition
Fig. 1 Bargaining set for the coalition {RUS, CHN, BRA}. The disagreement point is D. The bargaining
set is the triangle to the north-east of D. Point B marks the outside option payoffs for RUS and CHN. The
shaded triangle marks internally stable allocations
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{USA, HIA, CHN, BRA}. However, USA would prefer one of the other five bargaining
weight scenarios since in these scenarios it would benefit from being a free rider. Our
results also show that a stable cooperation between two regions with equal bargaining
weights, like CHN and ROW, can also be reached.
In order to compare the performance of stable coalitions that we find under different sets
of bargaining weights, we report more detailed results in Table 3. The table shows results
for the best-performing stable coalitions in terms of the net present value of global payoffs
for each set of bargaining weights. Table 3 shows that in general the set of bargaining
weights that favours large emitters can lead to higher abatement and welfare levels.
Among the five sets of bargaining weights, the highest global abatement and welfare
can be obtained under the coalition {USA, HIA, CHN, BRA} which is stable for bar-
gaining weights determined by GDP. The reasons for this finding are, firstly, that the size
of this coalition is the largest among all stable coalitions under different sets of bar-
gaining weights; secondly, this is due to the participation of the world’s two biggest
GHG emitting countries USA and CHN. Their GHG emissions account for a large part
of the world emissions; hence, the abatement level adopted by these two countries is also
prominent for global abatement and welfare. This result also reflects the important
impact of the participation by USA and CHN in the formation of ICAs. By contrast, the
coalition {CHN, BRA} that is stable when the bargaining weights are determined by
damages offers the lowest global abatement and welfare in our set of scenarios. It is even
Pareto dominated by {USA, HIA, CHN, BRA}. This result is straightforward to
understand: compared to other regions BRA is a region with higher marginal abatement
costs. Therefore, the equilibrium abatement level by BRA is lower, which results in the
lowest global abatement and welfare obtained by coalition {CHN, BRA}. In the refer-
ence scenario with equal bargaining weights, the global abatement of the stable coalition
{CHN, IND, BRA} is lower than what is achieved under other sets of asymmetric
bargaining weights, except for the weights derived from damages. Nevertheless, the
welfare obtained is higher, unless weights are determined by economic power. It can be
concluded that signatories with low marginal abatement costs forming a coalition with a
region with high marginal benefits lead to higher the abatement of the coalition. As
shown in Table 3, the success of the coalition largely depends on the participation of
both USA and CHN (cf. also Dellink 2011).
4.3 Results for the Nash bargaining solution with outside options
We introduced outside options to the NBS in Sect. 3 and discussed their role. We have
argued that the NBS falls into the class of optimal sharing rules when outside options are
considered. In this section, we examine the effects of outside options by comparing results
from the STACO model for bargaining with outside options with the Nash bargaining
outcomes of the previous subsection.
Under the NBS with outside options, signatories’ redistributed payoffs consist of their
outside option payoff plus a share of the remainder (
P
i2S Vi Sð Þ 
P
i2S Vi Sn if gð Þ). As
noted earlier, the distribution of the remainder does not affect coalition stability. Thus,
stability is independent of the bargaining weights when outside options matter. Our
numerical results show a large improvement in the NBS if outside options matter. Both
number and size of stable coalitions under the NBS with outside options can be improved
as compared to the results for the NBS without outside options. There are more than 190
stable coalitions. Stable coalitions comprise up to six members (e.g. {EUR, OHI, ROE,
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CHN, MES, BRA}, {EUR, ROE, HIA, CHN, MES, BRA}, {EUR, ROE, HIA, IND, MES,
BRA}). This comparison confirms the advantage of the optimal sharing rule in reducing
players’ free-rider incentives (cf. Weikard and Dellink 2014).
Since outside options are independent of the bargaining weights, any set of bargaining
weights will lead to the same set of stable coalitions. Hence, there is no need to report
results for different sets of bargaining weights in Table 4. The best-performing
stable coalition is {EUR, CHN, IND, ROW}. Table 4 reports the comparison of the two
best-performing stable coalitions that are formed under the NBS with and without outside
options, respectively. There are four members in each. In the case of bargaining with
outside options, several large GHG emitters (EUR, CHN, IND) are engaged. The high
abatement achieved not only generates large net gains for the coalition, but also brings
significant positive externalities for outsiders. However, due to large free-riding incentives,
the best-performing coalition is still of limited size. This enhancement of the abatement
efficiency also confirms the numerical results of the optimal sharing scheme obtained by
Carraro et al. (2006) and Weikard and Dellink (2014). As shown in the last row of Table 4,
we use an ‘indicator of success’ to represent the coalition’s efficiency in closing the
welfare (or abatement) gap between all singletons and grand coalition.1 The
Table 4 Comparison of two best-performing stable coalitions that are formed under the NBS with and
without outside options
Regions The best-performing stable coalition
under NBS with outside options:
{EUR, CHN, IND, ROW}
The best-performing coalition without
outside options: {USA, HIA, CHN,
BRA}
Annual abatement











USA 6.16 7542.84 7.80 4127.30
JPN 6.30 8954.01 6.31 7078.05
EUR 15.33 7548.66 12.66 8699.96
OHI 1.92 958.24 1.92 758.66
ROE 7.93 750.84 7.93 594.17
RUS 11.50 1741.76 11.50 1376.15
HIA 0.97 960.85 9.35 736.23
CHN 25.25 449.87 21.40 430.12
IND 39.22 329.31 14.85 299.96
MES 1.45 698.92 1.45 553.02
BRA 0.60 505.80 8.15 441.76
ROW 21.23 1447.48 3.80 1355.85
Global 15.95 31,888.57 11.79 26,451.22
Indicator of success (%) 29.38 36.00 15.90 23.00
Numbers in bold indicate the performances of signatories in a stable coalition. Indicator of success (%):
(NPV of global payoffs in a coalition—NPV of global payoffs in all singletons)/(NPV of global payoffs in
grand coalition—NPV of global payoffs in all singletons) 9100. A similar definition applies to abatement
1 The performance of grand coalition is reported in Table 7 in Appendix.
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stable coalition generated by the NBS with outside options shows a significant improve-
ment in decreasing the gap as compared to the coalition generated without outside options
(i.e. 36 and 23%).
5 Discussions and conclusions
In this paper, we examine the formation and performance of international climate agree-
ments in a cartel game when the distribution of coalitional gains is based on the NBS. We
consider different plausible sets of bargaining weights. Our analysis identifies and dis-
cusses some key factors driving heterogeneous negotiators’ bargaining power in interna-
tional climate negotiations for distributing cooperative gains. These potential determinants
provide insights into countries’ potential bargaining positions based on their different
characteristics. Furthermore, we consider outside options in the Nash bargaining solution
and discuss their role in improving the positive effect of the NBS on the formation and
efficiency of ICAs. Our numerical analysis employs the STACO model to investigate the
impact of the NBS with asymmetric bargaining power on the formation and efficiency of
ICAs.
Firstly, by applying the NBS without outside options to distribute coalitional gains,
players’ incentives to participate and abate can be increased, although to a limited
degree. The effects vary under different sets of bargaining weights. As numerical
results in SubSect. 4.2 show, only small coalitions can be stabilised when bargaining
weights are determined according to abatement efforts, abatement costs and climate
change damages. Our result is in line with the stability results of Weikard et al.
(2006), where the coalitional surplus is shared among signatories based on different
exogenous claims. In contrast, the size and performance of stable coalitions can be
improved when bargaining weights are determined according to the discount factor or
economic power.
Secondly, the NBS with outside options is more conducive to ICAs as compared to the
bargaining solution without considering outside options. As discussed in subsect. 3.6, the
bargaining outcome falls into the class of optimal sharing rules when outside options are
considered. The numerical results in terms of stability and performances of international
climate coalitions under the bargaining solution with outside options underline the
advantage of such transfers. Our analysis provides a rationale for the use of optimal sharing
rules: they result from a NBS with outside options (cf. Muthoo 1999).
Thirdly, multiple equilibrium climate coalitions can emerge from the NBS. In partic-
ular, under bargaining with outside options we find a large number of equilibrium coali-
tions. This finding is comparable to Carraro et al. (2006) and Nagashima et al. (2011),
where multiple equilibrium coalitions can form when optimal sharing schemes are
implemented.
Moreover, it turns out that by applying the NBS to the distribution of coalitional gains,
the success of international climate agreements depends on the set of bargaining weights
that matters in climate negotiation. Our analysis suggests that some sets of bargaining
weights generate more successful coalitions in terms of welfare and abatement than others.
For example, among five sets of asymmetric bargaining weights, the one determined by
negotiators’ economic power can facilitate a climate coalition that comprises two of the
largest emitters (CHN and USA) jointly with two other regions.
Nash bargaining solutions for international climate…
123
Our study has some immediate policy implications. Firstly, an ICA should be designed to
attract large GHG emitters. Generally, regions with higher GDP produce more emissions,
like USA, China or India. Thus, when regions with more economic power (higher GDP) can
benefit more from an agreement, they will have stronger incentives to join and, hence, more
successful ICAs can be formed. It might be controversial that economic power shapes
negotiations and determines outcomes. However, it should be noticed that economically
powerful regions with a high GDP may include regions with a relatively low GDP per
capita, such as China or India when compared to USA. Secondly, in the negotiation process
multiple determinants of bargaining power will play a role. This is because one country’s
incentives to cooperate on GHG mitigation are impacted in a complex way by factors that
are related to abatement options, climate change vulnerability and economic power. The
bargaining power of each negotiator is likely to be driven by multiple determinants.
One direction to extend our analysis is to study negotiators’ strategic behaviour when
bargaining power becomes an endogenous variable.2 This requires an extended dynamic
game setting where pre-negotiations determine the negotiation protocol (Wangler et al.
2013), and therefore, bargaining powers are relevant at the later stages of the game.
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Appendix
See Tables 5, 6 and 7 and Fig. 2.
Table 5 Regional aggregation




EUR EU27 & EFTA
OHI Other High Income
ROE Rest of Europe
RUS Russia





ROW Rest of the world
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment.
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Table 6 Discount rate, GDP and abatement benefit share of twelve regions in STACO 3
Discount rates GDP in the year 2011(Billion $) Regional shares of benefits (hiÞ
USA 0.0517 12,807.0 0.2263
JPN 0.0359 4831.4 0.1725
EUR 0.0388 13,708.0 0.2491
OHI 0.0636 1672.5 0.0345
ROE 0.0612 615.2 0.0271
RUS 0.0397 729.4 0.0403
HIA 0.0474 1973.4 0.0300
CHN 0.1117 3160.0 0.0620
IND 0.1444 803.2 0.0500
MES 0.0470 827.7 0.0249
BRA 0.0442 1266.0 0.0153
ROW 0.0530 3158.6 0.0680
Global – 45,552.4 ðP hi ¼ 1Þ
Table 7 All singletons and grand coalition

















USA 6.16 3507.55 25.87 12,795.98
JPN 6.30 4309.52 23.88 18,569.78
EUR 12.66 5173.23 32.13 21,508.83
OHI 1.92 463.33 37.08 1429.88
ROE 7.93 362.42 50.64 911.18
RUS 11.50 836.58 50.13 2292.19
HIA 0.97 464.00 29.85 609.19
CHN 6.77 283.53 39.64 -1353.45
IND 14.85 182.14 58.38 21.21
MES 1.45 337.73 73.04 367.20
BRA 0.60 244.52 20.23 393.91
ROW 3.80 816.73 40.94 1027.70
Global 6.88 16,981.28 37.73 58,573.6
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